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Articles
Robert J. Sharpe* Habeas Corpus in Canada
I. Introduction
Habeas corpus is a subject which has not attracted much attention
from legal writers and there has been no thorough examimation of
the nature of review which may be exercised on habeas corpus.1
The aim of this article is to provide a critical and comprehensive
account of the scope of review which is available on habeas corpus
in Canada. The subject is a technical one but may be of crucial
importance in those situations where habeas corpus is still a useful
remedy. It is not proposed to discuss all aspects of the law of habeas
corpus but simply to outline the nature of the powers of review
which are available.
In dealing with any aspect of the law of habeas corpus we are
confronted by the vagaries of the common law and with a somewhat
bewildering array of technical rules. The remedy as it exists in
Canada is derived from English common law and it is important to
read the Canadian authorities in the light of their common law
origins. This paper aims to explore the common law background, to
expound the rules which determine the scope of review and,
hopefully, through a careful analysis of the cases, to demonstrate
that the scope of review available on habeas corpus is not as narrow
as is sometimes suggested.
Quite clearly, habeas corpus is not a remedy which is
encountered regularly in day-to-day practice. While it does have an
established function in the review of extradition committals and
committals for trial, it has become a remedy which is used in those
relatively unusual situations where statutory appeals are inapprop-
riate. It has also suffered in Canada from what the courts have
regarded as improper use, and the judges tend to react by describing
in narrow terms the nature of review which is open.
*Robert J. Sharpe, McTaggart, Potts, Stone and Herridge, Toronto.
1. The treatment accorded scope of review in D. A. Cameron Harvey, The Law of
Habeas Corpus in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974) is discussed in my
review of the book: (1974), 24 U. of T. Law J. 453. For other accounts of the scope of
review, see: Amnon Rubinstein, Jurisdiction and Illegality (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1965) at 105-116; D. M. Gordon, "Challenging Convictions by Habeas
Corpus and Certiorari" (1959), 2 Crim. L.Q. 296.
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2. Form of Review
Initially, it is useful to look at the formal nature of review on habeas
corpus. The writ is directed to the jailer or person having custody or
control of the applicant. It requires that person to return to the court
on the day specified the body of the applicant together with the
documentation allegedly justifying his detention. The process
focuses upon the cause returned. If the return discloses a lawful
cause, the prisoner is remanded; if the cause returned is insufficient
or unlawful, the prisoner is released. The matter directly at issue is
simply the excuse or reason given.
The problem of defining the scope of review on habeas corpus
occurs where the propriety of the return depends upon a prior
decision, order, or determination. By what method and on what
grounds can the court 'go behind' the warrant and review that
determination? Under modern practice, habeas corpus cases are not
usually determined on a formal return, but on the affidavits of the
applicant and respondent. 2 The idea of trying the case on the return
is, therefore, somewhat misleading, but the technical considerations
of the return have largely shaped the scope of review on habeas
corpus. It is essential to keep those considerations in mind if the
cases are to be understood properly.
When the writ actually issued, the only material which was
brought before the court for consideration was the return of the
jailer. Holt C. J. pointed this out when he compared habeas corpus
and certiorari: "An [habeas, corpus] does not remove the record
tho' it does the cause, but a certiorari removes the record and cause
too. . .besides a certiorari goes to the Judge, but a [habeas corpus]
to the officer. . . "3 When, for example, there has been a conviction
or other judicial order, the jailer will usually have a written warrant
by which he claims justification for the detention, and his return
must either annex or contain a copy of the warrant. From this formal
point of view, habeas corpus may be described as a collateral
method of attack. 4 The writ is directed to the jailer rather than the
2. See Patrick Hartt, "Habeas Corpus and Certiorari in Criminal Cases" [1961]
Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures, 319.
3. Hetherington v. Reynolds (1705), 92 E. R. 848; Fort. 269. See also Fazakerly
v. Baldoe (1704), 7Mod. 177; 87 E. R. 932 at 933,per Holt C. J.: ". . .for there is
a difference in this respect between a habeas corpus and a certiorari: upon an
habeas corpus we have not the record itself as we have upon a certiorari. ..
4. For two of the rare instances where the courts have actually used the term
"collateral attack" to describe the powers of review on habeas corpus, see
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person or tribunal ordering the detention. The issue for determina-
tion is, in this sense, one between the prisoner and his detainor,
5
and the prior determination is only incidentally or collaterally
impugned. When a situation of collateral attack arises, 6 the court
cannot review the correctness of the prior decision, but it may
review the existence of jurisdiction.
7
It is clear, however, that more is involved than collateral attack,
and that this formal concept is inadequate to describe the powers of
review. Historically, the whole basis of the remedy was that the
return show cause for the imprisonment or, in other words, that the
return fully disclose a lawful .basis for the detention. This evolved
into something like review for 'error on the face of the return', and
the use of this technique is discussed in greater detail subsequently. 8
It will also be seen that methods have been devised which allow the
courts to go behind the formal documents returned and examine the
proceedings themselves. 9 The two crucial questions raised by the
cases may be summed up as follows: (1) 'what are the proper
grounds for review and, (2) the more technical question, what
material may properly be brought before the court?
3. Grounds For Review
(a) Jurisdictional Review
It has already been observed that habeas corpus constitutes a form of
collateral attack. In other words, the proceedings from which the
jailer derives justification for the imprisonment are impugned, but
in an indirect way. This simply means that although the order
questioned is not under appeal, it cannot support the detention if it
does not in law 'exist' or, in conventional terms, the applicant will
be released if the determination giving rise to the detention was
made without jurisdiction by the tribunal or body in question.
Minister of National Defence for Naval Services v. Pantelidis (1943), 58 B.C.R.
321 at 327; [1943] 1 D.L.R. 569 at 572 (Sub nom. R. v. Pantelidis); 79 C.C.C. 46
at 49 (B.C.C.A.); Re Khattar (1927), 59 N.S.R. 191; [1927] 2 D.L.R. 647 (Sub
nom. ReR. v. Khattar, Exparte Thebeault) 47 C.C.C. 184 (N.S.S.C.).
5. This is, of course, somewhat artificial, and legislation or practice may require
that the Attorney-General be served as well; see e.g. The Habeas Corpus Act,
R.S.O. 1970, c. 197, s. 1(2).
6. Rubinstein, supra, note 1 at 39-46 gives several examples of collateral attack.
7. Id., at 36.
8. Infra.
9. Infra.
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There are many instances of habeas corpus issuing where the
basis of review is that the impugned proceedings were taken without
jurisdiction. The concept of jurisdictional review emerged early in
the history of the struggle between the common law courts and the
other jurisdictions for control. Habeas corpus was one of the
principal weapons in the hands of the common law courts,
especially in the days when committal was one of the principal
means of enforcing orders. Thus in the seventeenth century habeas
corpus was used to challenge the wrongful exercise of jurisdiction
by the High Commission and the other rivals of the common law
courts. 10 The concept of jurisdictional review emerged with special
strength in magisterial law, both in England and in Canada. It is
from these cases that many of the principles of review are still
drawn and, as the courts frequently refer to those cases, a brief
review is warranted.
(i) Magisterial Cases
In the magisterial cases, the superior courts placed great
importance upon formal or technical matters. The leading principle
of magisterial law was that it had to appear from the face of the
record that the tribunal had acted within the statutory limits. 1 '
Nothing was presumed in favour of instruments issued by inferior
courts, and jurisdictional review often meant 'Has the inferior court
made jurisdiction manifest?' rather than 'Has the inferior court in
fact acted within its jurisdicti6n?'. 12 Sucess often depended upon
10. See, for example: Glanvile's Case (1614), 1 Moore K.B. 838; 72 E.R. 939,
(Chancery); Humfrey (1571), Dal. 82 (Court of Requests); Thomlinson (1604), 12
Co. Rep. 104; 77 E.R. 1379. (Admiralty); Codd v. Turback (1615), 181 E.R. 94; 3
Bulst. 109 and Hodd v. High Commission Court (1615), 181 E.R. 125; 3 Bulst.
146 (High Commission).
11. For the rationale see the dictum of Holt C. i. in R. v. Whistler (1702), 90 E.R.
1018; Holt K. B. 215 at 215-16: ". . .the defendant is put to a summary trial
different from Magna Charta: for it is a fundamental privilege of Englishmen to be
tried by jury... Then where a penalty is inflicted, and a different manner of trial
from Magna Charta instituted; and the party offending, instead of being openly
tried by his neighbours in a Court of Justice, shall be convicted by a single justice
of peace in a private chamber, upon the testimony of one witness; I fain would
know, if on the consideration of such a law, we ought not to adhere to the letter of
the law, without carrying the words farther than the natural sense of them."-
12. See e.g. Re Douglas (1842), 12 L.J.Q.B. 49, where the court (incorrectly)
refused to look at affidavits to prove want of jurisdiction, but discharged the
prisoner because the warrant did not recite the same matter and thereby make
jurisdiction patent.
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technical considerations, but at the same time, the inferior courts
were required to set out their proceedings in great detail so as to
make them readily subject to review. 
13
Habeas corpus was used primarily to review warrants of
committal, and the requirement that the inferior process show
jurisdiction on its face made for a pervasive form of review. 1
4 It will
be seen that statutuory changes have rendered this basis for review
for the most part obsolete, 15 but occasionally modern examples are
found. One such Canadian case is re Munavish' 6 where the court
held that it could look only at the warrant of committal issued under
the Ticket of Leave Act, 6a but discharged the prisoner as the
warrant did not show jurisdiction on its face. While, technically, it
had always been the rule that nothing can be assumed in favour of
the validity of an inferior process, reasoning of this sort now seems
tortured. There can be little doubt that the basis for the decision was
that there really had been a jurisdictional defect. Basing the decision
on the failure of the warrant to recite jurisdiction on its face is
entirely artificial. 17
13. The reason for this was undoubtedly because there was no other form of
redress. A writ of error did not lie to challenge a summary conviction: R. v.
Leighton (1708), 92 E.R. 806; Fort. 173;R. v.Lomas (1694), 90 E.R. 488; Comb.
297. Before the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict., c. 49), the right of
appeal by trial de novo to quarter sessions was granted only in some cases and
before the introduction of appeal by stated case to the High Court by the Summary
Jurisdiction Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict., c. 43), there was no method, aside from the
prerogative writs, to bring a conviction or warrant before a court of superior
jurisdiction for review: see Paley on Summary Convictions (9th ed. London: Sweet
& Maxwell, 1926) at 670ff.
14. See, for example, the decision of Coleridge J. in Re Peerless (1841), 1 Q.B.
143 at 154; 113 E.R. 1084 at 1089: "The question is whether the warrant, which
the gaoler has returned, be a legal one. Of the conviction we know nothing, except
through the warrant. By a legal warrant I mean a warrant which upon the face of it
shews a right to detain: and that right cannot exist unless there be jurisdiction in the
magistrates. To deny that this must appear on the face of the proceedings, is to call
in question one of the most important rules of criminal law." The principle was
applied in many Canadian cases: See, eg. Re Beebe (1863), 3 P.R. 270, Re Crow
(1865), 1 C.L.J. 302 (U.C.);R. v. Sears (1897), 17 C.L.T. 124 (N.S.S.C.):R. v.
Townsend (No. 3) (1906), 11 C.C.C. 153 (N.S.S.C.).
15. Infra.
16. (1958), 26 W.W.R. 175; 121 C.C.C. 299 (B.C.S.C.).
16a. R.S.C. 1952, c. 264.
17. Cf. Re Pearce & Warden of Manitoba Penitentiary (1966), 55 D.L.R. (2d)
619; 54 W.W.R. 720; [1966] 3 C.C.C. 326 (Man. C.A.); aff'd (1966) 55 D.L.R.
631; 57 W.W.R. 127 (S.C.C.) discussed infra, note 26.
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There are also English 8 and Canadian cases 19 where habeas
corpus has been used to review a summary conviction itself. In the
older cases, there was a tendency to base review on the failure of the
conviction as recited in the committal to reveal jurisdiction on its
face, 20 but there have also been instances where the courts have
reviewed convictions on habeas corpus on the basis of extrinsic
evidence to show some jurisdiction defect.
2 1
The common law courts were reluctant to curtail review of
magisterial orders, even where review was based on insubstantial
errors. 2 2 There is even a case where the court ordered the prisoner's
release on the basis of a defect in the committal notwithstanding that
a good conviction to support the imprisonment was brought up on
certiorari.23 However, the English Summary Jurisdiction Acts of
184 8 23a and 1 8 7 9 23b curtailed this form of review, both on
certiorari and on habeas corpus, by providing for simplified and
abbreviated standard forms of conviction and committal which were
to be deemed sufficient. 24 A similar provision in the Canadian
18. Nash'sCase (1821), 106 E.R. 946;4 B. & Ald. 295;R. v. Tordoft (1844), 114
E.R. 1500; 5 Q.B. 933; Re Gray (1844), 14 L.J.M.C. 26; 2 Dow. & L. 539; Re
Hammond (1846), 115 E.R. 1210; 9 Q.B. 92; Re Seth Turner (1846), 115 E.R.
1206; 9 Q.B. 80; and cases citedinfra, note 21.
19. See e.g. R. v. Smith (1909), 8 E.L.R. 33; 16 C.C.C. 425 (N.S.S.C.); R. v.
Johnston (1912), 22 Man. R. 426; 1 D.L.R. 549; 1 W.W.R. 1045; 20 C.C.C. 8
(Sub nom. R. v. Johnston) (Man. K.B.); R. v. Farrell (1907), 15 O.L.R. 100; 12
C.C.C. 524 (Ont. H. C.);ReR. v. Campbell (1924),43 C.C.C. 340 (Ont. S.C.) 27
O.W.N. 88; in these Canadian cases, certiorari-in-aid was joined with the habeas
corpus application.
20. See e.g. the cases cited note 18,supra.
21. Re Bailey, Re Collier (1854), 118 E.R. 1269; 3 E. & B. 607; In Re Clew
(1881), 8 Q.B.D. 511 ;In ReAuthers (1889), 22 Q.B.D. 345.
22. If the warrant was defective for some technical reason unrelated to the
conviction, it was said that a perfect conviction could not cure the defect: R. v.
Fletcher (1843), 8 J.P. 168;R. v. Chandler (1704), 91 E.R. 1265; 1 Ld. Raym.
545;R. v. James (1822), 106 E.R. 1418; 5 B. & Aid. 894. Where the validity of
the conviction as recited was impugned, the courts sometimes said that it was
incumbent upon anyone who asserted it to be good to have it brought before the
court: Re Reynolds (1844), 1 Dow. & L. 846 (where the conviction had even been
previously affirmed); R. v. Chaney (1838), 7 L.J.M.C. 65; R. v. Timson (1870),
L.R. 5 Exch. 257; Re Allen (1860), 30 L.J.Q.B. 38; Re Hammond (1846), 115
E.R. 1210; 9 Q.B. 92;R. v. Tordoft (1844), 114 E.R. 1500; 5 Q.B. 933.
23. Re Elmy (1834), 110 E.R. 1430 at 1433 1 Ad. & E. 843 at 850,per Denman
C.J.: "As this is a proceeding which restrains the liberty of the subject, it ought to
appear that the thing done was in perfect conformity to the statute."
23a. 11 & 12 Vict., c. 42.
23b. 42 & 43 Vict., c. 49.
24. In re Allison (1854), 156 E.R. 561 at 565; 10 Ex. 561 at 568 per Platt B.:
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Criminal Code2 5 provides: "No warrant of committal shall, on
certiorari or habeas corpus, be held to be void by reason only of
any defect therein, where (a) it is alleged in the warrant that the
defendent was convicted, and (b) there is a valid conviction to
sustain the warrant". Even where a committal is not covered by
such a provision, the courts are now less likely to give relief without
looking at the proceedings themselves to determine whether there is
more than a technical defect on the committal. 26 In any event, it
should be remembered that these provisions do not preclude
jurisdictional review of summary proceedings. Their effect is to
make the inferior process less vulnerable to review, and to require
that jurisdictional error be shown to exist rather than letting review
depend on the formalities of the document supporting the
committal.
(ii) Modern Examples
Habeas corpus is still used in Canada to review for jurisdictional
error, summary convictions, 27 committals for trial,28 extradition
committals, 2 9 committals under mental health legislation, 3" and
committals in the law of immigration,31 to give a few examples.
It should be noted, however, that the practice in Canada is almost
invariably to join an application for centiorari-in-aid to which the
"The learning of the cases prior to [the 1848 Act] has been swept away..." As
Lord Sumner explained in his well-known dictum in R. v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd.,
[1922] 2 A.C. 128 (P.C.) at 159 (Alta.): "The Summary Jurisdiction Act. . .did
not stint the jurisdiction of the Queen's Bench, or alter the actual law of certiorari.
What it did was to disarm its exercise. The effect was not to make that which had
been error, error no longer, but to remove nearly all opportunity for its detection.
The face of the record "spoke" no longer: it was the inscrutable face of a sphinx."
25. R.S.C 1970, C-34, s. 716.
26. R. v. Governor of Lewes Prison, exp. Doyle, [1917] 2 K.B. 254 at 269. InRe
Pearce and Warden of Manitoba Penitentiary (1966), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 619; 54
W.W.R. 720; [1966] 3 C:C.C. 326 (Man. C.A.); affd (1966) 55 D.L.R. (2d)
631a; 57 W.W.R. 127 (S.C.C.), the omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta
presumption was applied, even though the court was dealing with a magistrate's
warrant.
27. Supra, note 19.
28. Infra, at
29. Infra, at
30. See, e.g. Trenholm v. A. -G. Ont., [1940] S.C.R. 301; [1940] 1 D.L.R. 49
(Sub nom. Re Trenholm); 73 C.C.C. 129; Re Avery, [1951] O.W.N. 810 (Ont.
H.C.).
31. See, e.g. Shin Shim v. The King, [1938] S.C.R. 378; [1938]4 D.L.R. 88; 70
C.C.C. 321.
248 The Dalhousie Law Journal
powers of review are usually attributed. In England, by way of
contrast, certiorari-in-aid is rarely used, and the courts feels no
restriction in reviewing for jurisdictional error.3 2 The significance
of this for Canadian practice is that certiorari-in-aid is not always
available.3 3 It is submitted that the absence of certiorari-in-aid
should not prevent the court from granting a discharge where the
prisoner is able to show want of jurisdiction by affidavit.
3 4
The problem in this area is, of course, to determine just what is
meant by jurisdictional error. In administrative law generally, the
courts have tended recently to construe broadly their powers of
review, and the bounds of jurisdictional error often seem to be
without limit.35 On the other hand, many of the habeas corpus cases
arise out of criminal proceedings, and here the Canadian courts have
shown a marked determination to confine challenges to the legality
of proceedings to the channel of statutory appeals. 3 6 In cases where
there is no statutory appeal and in non-criminal situations, the courts
tend to construe jurisdictional error broadly.3 7 It is not the province
of this paper to discuss the meaning of jurisdictional error: suffice to
say that there is no definition of predictive value and the result will
depend not only on the substance of the error alleged but also on the
availability of other means of redress.
Theoretically, the principle that review is restricted to jurisdic-
tional error means that an inferior court has an area within which it
is free to err and still have its decision respected as having validity.
However, this area has been encroached upon to such an extent in
judicial review cases that it becomes difficult to imagine any error
32. A good example is R. v. Board of Control, ex parte Rutty, [1956] 2 Q.B. 109
where a magistrate's decision was attacked on habeas corpus, the error of
jurisdiction being brought before the court by affidavit.
33. This has arisen recently in Saunders v. The Queen, [1970] S.C.R. 109; 10
D.L.R. (3d) 638; 71 W.W.R. 4 [1970] 2 C.C.C. 57 where an order of preventive
detention had to be attacked on habeas corpus alone as certiorari-in-aid was
refused. It does not appear to have been argued that jurisdictional error could be
shown by affidavit.
34. Discussed in more detail, infra.
35. For leading examples of this, see Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation
Commission, [1969] 2 A.C. 147 (H.L. (E.)); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 796, [1970] S.C.R. 425; 11
D.L.R. (3d) 336.
36. Infra, at
37. "There is no want of modem authority to draw upon when a court is inclined
to hold that an erroneous finding by a statutory tribunal goes to jurisdiction." S.A.
de Smith, Judical Review of Administrative Action (3d ed. London: Stevens, 1974)
at 105.
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of law which could not somehow be classified as jurisdictional.3 8
The English habeas corpus cases have taken this line,3 9 and, if the
Canadian cases which deal with challenges to criminal convictions
are distinguisheda9 a, there seems to be a similar approach here. The
important point is that the error alleged must somehow be seen to
'go to jurisdiction' and the willingness of the court to so classify the
error will depend very much upon the type of decision being
questioned.
(b) Patent Error
In addition to review based on jurisdictional error, it is submitted
that there is a second branch of review on habeas corpus which is
akin to review for error of law on the face of the record in
certiorari-type proceedings. The source of this power of review is
really the requirement that the return patently show cause for the
imprisonment. In the old cases, the courts insisted upon a full return
which set out the complete basis for the imprisonment, 40 and it is
really upon this requirement that habeas corpus depended for its
effectiveness.
In other words, the object of the writ is to bring before the court a
return which demonstrates cause for the imprisonment, and, while
the whole record of the proceedings is not necessarily brought
before the court, the return is subjected to a search for error on its
face. In a recent House of Lords decision, Lord Pearce adverted to
this power of review on habeas corpus in the following passage:
"The High Court has always had the power by writs of habeas
corpus and certiorari to correct any error of law provided that it is
able to see that the error has occurred. . .in certiorari difficult
38. Supra, notes 35 and 37; S.A. de Smith, "Judical Review in Administrative
Law: The Ever-Open Door?", (1969), 27 Camb. L.J. 161 at 163-4; H.W.R.
Wade, "Constitutional and Administrative Aspect of the Anisminic Case" (1969),
85 L.Q.R. 198 at 211-2; and "Evidence and Ultra Vires" (1971), 87 L.Q.R. 318
at 319.
39. The best recent examples are R. v. Board of Control, ex parte Rutty, [ 1956] 2
Q.B. 109 andArmah v. Government of Ghana, [1968] A.C. 192 (H.L. (E.)).
39a. See infra; "'superior and inferior courts".
40. See, e.g., Chamber's Case (1628), 79 E.R. 717; Cro. Car. 133; Codd v.
Turback (1615), 81 E.R. 94; 3 Bulst. 109; 1 Hale P.C. 584: "[A warrant of
commitment must] express the cause for which he is committed, namely felony,
and what kind of felony. . .it is necessary upon return of the habeas corpus out of
the King's Bench, because it is in the nature of a writ of right or a writ of error to
determine whether the imprisonment be good or erroneous."
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questions may arise as to whether an error appears on the face of the
record. . .In habeas corpus the question was whether an error
appeared on the return of the writ."
41
While certiorari is required to bring up the whole record, the
courts have, on occasion, achieved a very similar result on habeas
corpus by requiring a full return. The classic example is the decision
of Vaughan C. J. in Bushell's Case42 where the Court of Common
Pleas ordered the discharge of a juryman who had been committed
for contempt by the London Court of Sessions. The contempt
alleged was that the prisoner, together with the other jurymen, had
refused to convict an accused despite the weight of the evidence.
43
Vaughan C. J. made it clear that the court could not be satisfied with
a bald warrant of committal;
The Court hath no knowledge by this retorn, whether the
evidence given were full and manifest, or doubtful, lame, and
dark, or indeed evidence at all material to the issue, because it is
not retorn'd what evidence in particular, and as it was deliver'd,
was given. For it is not possible to judge of that rightly, which is
not expos'd to a man's judgement. But here the evidence given to
the jury is not exposed at all to this Court, but the judgement of
the Court of Sessions upon that evidence is only expos'd to us;
who tell us it was full and manifest. But our judgement ought to
be grounded upon our own inferences and understandings, and
not upon theirs.44
The case suggests a pervasive power of review based upon inquiry
into the sufficiency of the return.
There are many other examples of this sort of reasoning in the old
English cases. Where the decisions of bankruptcy commissioners
were challenged on habeas corpus, the courts were able to exercise
a kind of direct review through the requirement that the proceedings
be recited in full in the committal document. 45 There was no
pretence of jurisdictional review in these cases, but simply an
acceptance of the position that if the court could see an error patent
on the material, it would give relief.46 In magisterial law the rule
41. Armah v. Government of Ghana, [1968] A.C. 192 (H.L. (E.)). at 253-4.
42. 124E.R. 1006; (1670) Vaughan 135.
43. The trial isPenn & Mead's Case (1670), 6 St. Tr. 951.
44. (1670) 124 E.R. 1006 at 1007; Vaughan 135 at 137.
45. See, e.g. Coombe's Case (1816), 2 Rose 396;Exparte Oliver (1813), 1 Rose
407, 35 E.R. 312; 2 V. & B. 244; Tomlin's Case (1824), 1 Glyn. & Jam. 373;
Atkinson's Case (1827), 2 Glyn. & Jam. 218.
46. Lord Eldon described the nature of review as follows in Coombe's Case
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was that: ". . .the cause of committment ought to be certain, to the
end that the party may know for what he suffers, and how he may
regain his liberty. .. " Here, the powers of review may seem to
merge with that of jurisdictional review and the requirement that the
documents show jurisdiction on their face,48 but it is clear that
non-jurisdictional errors were also reviewed.49 More recently, the
English courts seem to have revived the concept of review for patent
error, as distinct from jurisdictional error, when reviewing the
sufficiency of evidence in extradition committals. 50
The courts do not, it should be noted, use the term 'patent error'
to describe this sort of review, but it is submitted that there are
Canadian cases which most properly come within this category.
Good examples are the cases where a prisoner has been discharged
because the warrant fails to describe an offence fully or
accurately. 51 Other cases which may be placed in this category are
those where habeas corpus is used to review the term of a sentence.
The court is not called upon to review the propriety of the sentence
but the court does determine whether or not by its own terms, the
committal provides present justification for holding the prisoner.
52
(c) Review of Sufficiency of Evidence
The review of sufficiency of evidence on habeas corpus presents
certain special problems. In the first place, it must be recognized
(1816), 2 Rose 396 at 398: ". . [there must be] satisfaction to a reasonable mind:
in the first instance, to the mind of the Commissioners, in the next, to the mind of
the Judge, as it were, appealed to, upon a habeas corpus. Thus appealed to, the
court has to exercise its own opinion upon the reasonableness of the examination."
47. Dr. Groenvelt's Case (1702), 91 E.R. 1038; 1 Ld. Raym. 213.
48. Discussedsupra at
49. For examples, see: R. v. Chaney (1838), 7 L.J.M.C. 65; Ex p. Hill (1827),
172 E.R. 394; 3 Cor. & P. 225; Re Timson (1870), L.R. 5 Exch. 257;
(misstatement of offence in the warrant of commitment); R. v. James (1822), 106
E.R. 1418; 5 B. & Aid. 894;Mash's Case (1772), 96 E.R. 473; 2 Black W. 805;
R. v. Catterall (1730), 94 E.R. 705; Fitz-G. 266 (failure to state adequately the
term of imprisonment).
50. Armah v. Government of Ghana, [1968] A.C. 192 (H.L.(E.)).
51. R. v. Holley (1893), 4 C.C.C. 510 (N.S.S.C.); R. v. McDonald (1910), 8
E.L.R. 489; 16 C.C.C. 505 (N.S.S.C.);R. v. Nelson (1908), 18 O.L.R. 484; 15
C.C.C. 10 (Ont. H.C.); Re Dudoward (1959), 28 W.W.R. 202; 124 C.C.C. 379
(B.C.S. C.).
52. See, eg. R. v. Robinson (1907), 14 O.L.R. 519; 12 C.C.C. 447 (Ont. H.C.);
ExparteMcCaud, [1970] 1 OR. 772; [1970] 1 C.C.C. 293 (Ont. H.C.);ReAnge,
[1970] O.R. 153; [1970] 5 C.C.C. 371 (Ont. C.A.); Ex p. Newfield (1973), 9
C.C.C. (2d) 222 (Alta. S.C.).
252 The Dalhousie Law Journal
that there has always been some confusion about want of evidence
as a ground for judical review. The orthodox position is the view
taken by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in R. v. Nat
Bell Liquors in 1922.53 There it was said that want of evidence may
render a decision wrong on the merits but not wrong in the
jurisdictional sense. Clearly, this view has not been followed
consistently and there is considerable authority for the proposition
that a decision made with no evidence at all is a decision made
without jurisdiction. 54 In addition, there are more subtle ways
around the rule, as described by Professor Wade: "A decision based
on no evidence is very likely capricious or unreasonable, or given
upon wrong legal grounds, or in breach of natural justice, so that the
court, if it wants to intervene, can do so. 55 Indeed, it may be asked
whether the recent statutory measures in Ontario56 and in the
Federal Court Act, 57 establishing want of evidence as a ground for
review, are properly seen as legislative innovation or simply
legislative sanction for what already was being done.
In the law of habeas corpus, the review of sufficiency of
evidence is a fairly well-established practice, although the courts
have shown an uncertainty in approach. It is an especially important
ground for review in cases involving committals for trial and
extradition committals. An understanding of the historical back-
ground is important here, and it is proposed to discuss the manner in
which this power of review developed as well as the manner in
which it may now be used.
Historically, habeas corpus played an important role in criminal
procedure as a pre-trial remedy. It was the accepted method by
which a person committed by the local justices could appeal to the
general power of the King's Bench to grant bail, 58 and it provided a
general method of review over pre-trial proceedings. The prisoner
could argue that the justice had wrongly refused him bail, 59 that the
evidence against him was too weak to warrant holding him for
53. R. v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd., [1922] 2 A.C. 128 (P.C.) (Alta.).
54. D. W. Elliott, " 'No Evidence': A Ground for Judicial Review in Canadian
Administrative Law?" (1972-73), 37 Sask. L.R. 48.
55. H. W. R. Wade, Administrative Law, (3d ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971)
at 101 (footnotes omitted).
56. The Judicial Review Procedure Act, S.O. 1971, c. 48, s. 2(3).
57, Federal CourtAct, S.C. 1970-71, c. 1, s. 28(1)(c).
58. 2 HaleP.C. at 143-8.
59. Id., at 145
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trial,60 or that the charges against him were deficient in law. 61 For
present purposes, the important aspect of the review which was
exercised was the extent to which the judges looked into the
evidence. In exercising their inherent powers to grant bail, the
judges wanted to know the facts of the case. The depositions taken
by the justice were brought before the court and, however good or
bad the committal document, the court decided for itself on the
evidence whether there was a case to put the accused to trial.6 2 This
provided for a very full review of the pre-trial proceedings on
habeas corpus, the nature of which was remarkably similar to that
now required by the Criminal Code where a superior court is called
upon to review the refusal of judicial interim release.63
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a summary
application replaced habeas corpus as the method of applying for
bail in the superior court. 64 This meant that when habeas corpus
was used as a method to review the sufficiency of evidence to
support committals, the court was no longer acting under its
inherent power to grant bail. To explain the basis for their action,
the judges began to use the language of jurisdictional review. They
really continued the old practice and probably worried little about
60. Infra, note 62.
61. 2 HaleP.C. I11;R. v. Kendal&Roe (1700), 91 E.R. 304; 1 Salk. 347;R. v.
Judd (1788), 100 E.R. 139; 2 T.R. 255; R. v. Remnant (1793), 101 E.R. 96; 5
T.R. 169. For modern Canadian examples, see supra, note 51.
62. R. v. Horner (1783), 168 E.R. 237 at 238; 1 Leach 270 at 270-1: "The
practice of this Court is, and upon reference to the Officers of the Crown Office we
find it to have been long established, that even where the commitment is regular,
the Court will look into the depositions to see if there be a sufficient ground laid to
detain the party in custody; and if there be not, they will bail him. So also, where
the commitment is irregular, if it appear that a serious offence has been committed,
they will not discharge or bail a prisoner without first looking into the depositions,
to see whether there is sufficient evidence to detain him in custody." See also:
Mohun (1698), 91 E.R. 96; 1 Salk. 104;Anon (1704), 91 E.R. 96; 1 Salk. 104;R.
v.Dalton (1731), 93 E.R. 936;2 Str. 911;R. v.Judd (1788), 100E.R. 139;2T.R.
255;R. v. Gittus (1824)3 L.J.O.S.K.B. 55;R. v. Manning (1888), 5 T.L.R. 139;
Chitty, Criminal Law (lst ed., London: Samuel Brooke, 1816), vol. 1. at 113, 129;
Petersdorff, Law of Bail (1824) at 520.
63. Section 457.5(7).
64. F. H. Short & F. H. Mellor, Crown Practice (2d ed., London: Stevens &
Haynes, 1908), at 284. The statute which established the practice in Canada
provided: "Upon. . .application [for bail] to any such court or judge. . .the same
order concerning the prisoner being bailed or continued in custody, shall be made
as if the prisoner was brought up upon a habeas corpus." (S. 94, R.S.C. 1886, c.
174, carried through until the 1955 Code revision: Martin, Criminal Code
(Toronto: Cartwright, 1955) at 769.
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the technical justification for such action. The introduction of
jurisdictional error as the ground for review did, however, introduce
a problem: namely, a conflict with the orthodox view that 'no
evidence' does not go to jurisdiction.6 5 This accounts for the
uncertainty in approach which is so evident on reading the cases.
As noted, the Canadian authorities seem to support as a minimum
the proposition that making a finding with absolutely no evidence
renders the decision reviewable. In the habeas corpus cases the
courts regularly use this restrictive formula to describe the extent to
which they will review the evidence. It is important, however, to
recognize that the nature of review which is actually exercised is not
as narrow as this sort of language might suggest. In the first place,
there must be some evidence on each one of the requisite elements
which are required to support the committal, and the court will
review the evidence to see that a case has been made out on each
point.6 6 Secondly, "no evidence" or "absolutely no evidence"
have been interpreted to mean "no reasonable evidence." A mere
scintilla of evidence will not support a committal; habeas corpus
lies to determine whether there is "any reasonable and legal
evidence". 6 7 It is also clear on reading the cases that whatever the
formula used to describe the powers of review, the courts will
interfere where the evidence is not reasonably capable of supporting
the committal. 68 It is a question of degree: on the one hand, the
court will not hear additional evidence to exculpate the accused,6 9
nor will it actually weigh the evidence as it would at a trial. On the
other hand, the courts have been scrupulous to make certain that
there is evidence on each point requisite to support the charges, and
65. Supra.
66. See, e.g. Exp. Welsh (1898), 2 R. de Jur. 437; 2 C.C.C. 35 (Que. Sup. Ct.);
Re Cohen (1904), 8 O.L.R. 143; 8 C.C.C. 251 (Ont. H.C.);R.v. Morency (1917),
30 C.C.C. 395 (Que. Sup. Ct.); In re Harrison (No. 3) (1918), 25 B.C.R. 545; 30
C.C.C. 150 (sub nom. Re. Harrison) (B.C.S.C.);Re O'Connor (1928), 39 B.C.R.
271; [1928)1 D.L.R. 58; [1928] 1 W.W.R. 65 (B.C.S.C.); 49 C.C.C. 151.
67. Ex. p. Seitz (No. 1) (1899), 8 Que. R. 345 at 346-7; 3 C.C.C. 54 (Que. Q.B,)
at 56,per Wurtele J. See also the cases cited infra, notes 68 and 70.
68. Often the courts use restrictive language to describe their powers of review,
and then (properly, it is submitted) enter a detailed inquiry of the evidence to
determine whether it matches up to the requisite standard: see, eg. Ex. p. Feinberg
(1901), 4 C.C.C. 270 (Que. K.B.); Browne v. U.S. (1906), 30 Que. S: 11 C.C.C.
167 (sum. nom. U.S. v. Browne (No. 2)) (Que. Sup. Ct.); Re Insull, [1934]
O.W.N. 194; [1934]2 D.L.R. 696; (1934), 61 C.C.C. 336 (Ont. C.A.).
69. In re Cohen (1904), 8 O.L.R. 143; 8 C.C.C. 251 (Ont. S.C.); Schtraks v.
Government of Israel, [1964] A.C. 556 (H.L. (E.)).
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to ensure that the magistrate has not acted capriciously. In other
words, while the magistrate is clearly left some room for the
unfettered exercise of his discretion, the superior court will make
certain that there is reasonable evidence to bring the case within that
area where the magistrate's discretion may properly be exercised.
70
The test is variously phrased as requiring sufficient evidence to raise
a primafacie case against the accused, or enough evidence to allow
a trial judge to leave the case with the jury.
71
A more technical problem is to provide justification for having
the evidence before the court on habeas corpus at all. The English
courts have not been concerned about this question when reviewing
extradition committals, but have simply carried on the common law
practice of perusing the depositions. 72 In the Canadian cases,
however, this has caused considerable concern and it has been
found necessary to employ certiorari-in-aid of habeas corpus. 73
In Ontario, justification for reviewing the evidence is said to be
based on the pre-Confederation Act for More Effectually Securing
the Liberty of the Subject. 74 It was provided by that Act that the
court may
direct the issuing of a writ of certiorari. . .directed to the person
or persons by whom or by whose authority any such person is
confined or restrained of his liberty. . .requiring him to certify
and return. . .the evidence, depositions, convictions, and all
proceedings had or taken, touching or concerning such
confinement or restraint of liberty, to the end that the same may
be viewed and considered by such Judge or Court, and to the end
70. For cases which construe broadly the power of the superior court to examine
the evidence, seeRe Garbutt (1891), 21 O.R. 465 (Ont. C.A.);Re MacKey (1918),
52 N.S.R. 165; 29 C.C.C. 167 (sub nom. R. v. MacKey) aff'd 52 N.S.R. 176; 40
D.L.R. 287; 29 C.C.C. 282 (N.S.S.C.); Re McTier (1910), 17 C.C.C. 80 (Que.
K.B.); R. v. Arsino (1920), 19 O.W.N. 136; C.C.C. 251 (Ont. H.C.); R. v.
Keeper of Cornwall Jail; ex p. Pendergast, [1964] 1 O.R. 443; [1964] 2 C.C.C.
264 (Ont. H.C.).;Ex.p. Rabin (1961), 130 C.C.C. 251.
71. See, eg. R. v. Cowden, [1947] O.W.N. 1018; [1948] 1 D.L.R. 682; 90
C.C.C. 101 (Ont. H.C.), R. v. Plouffe and Warren [1959] O.W.N. 30; (sub nom.
Ex parte Plouffe) 122 C.C.C. 291; 29 C.R. 297 (Ont. H.C.); R.E. Salhany,
"Review of Committal for Trial" (1965), 8 Crim. L.Q. 31. The standard of proof
required may vary depending upon the extradition statute; R. v. Delisle (1896), 2
R.L.N.S. 326; 5 C.C.C. 210 (Que. Q.B.).
72. See Schtraks v. Government of Israel, [1964] A.C. 556 (H.L. (E.)); and
especially Armah v. Government of Ghana, [1968] A.C. 192 (H.L.(E.)).
73. ReShumiatcher, [1962] S.C.R. 38; 31 D.L.R. (2d.)2; 131 C.C.C. 259.
74. 29 and 30 Vict., c. 45 (1866). For a discussion of the applicability of the Act,
see Ex parte Johnston, [1959] O.R. 322; 18 D.L.R. (2d) 102; 124 C.C.C. 23 (sub
nom. Re Johnston and Shane) (Ont. C.A.)
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that the sufficiency thereof to warrant such confinement or
restraint, may be determined by such Judge or Court.
7 5
Properly this Act should be read as a codification of the common
law practice already described. 76 However, the courts in Ontario
have tended to give the Act rather more credit, and have held that
the broad inquiry into the validity of committals is founded entirely
upon its provisions. 77 This has unfortunately caused some
confusion in the provinces which do not have similar legislation and
where it has been suggested that this pervasive review of pre-trial
proceedings may not be available. 78 However, despite the doubts
raised, a relatively uniform practice seems to have evolved. When
forced to deal with the matter without the help of such legislation,
the courts have tended to rely on common law certiorari-in-aid to
justify the review of the evidence. 79 As noted, the English courts
achieve the same result on habeas corpus alone.80 Where review of
the evidence is based on certiorari-in-aid, it is not at all clear
whether this review of the evidence is an exercise in jurisdictional
review or review of patent error. 81
75. Section 5.
76. R. v. Mosier (1867), 4 P.R. 64 (Ont.)at 70.
77. See, e.g. R. v. Farrell (1907), 15 O.L.R. 100; 12 C.C.C. 524 (Ont. H.C.);R.
v. Page (1923), 53 O.L.R. 70; [1923]3 D.L'.R. 854; 41 C.C.C. 59 (Ont. C.A.);R.
v. Riesy (1931), 39 O.W.N. 507; 55 C.C.C. 328 (Ont. H.C.); R. v. Massey
(1923), 25 O.W.N. 164 (Ont. H.C.); Ex p. McGinnis, [1971] 3 O.R. 783; 4
C.C.C. (2d) 262 (Ont. H.C.); and seeRe McDonald (1936), 11 M.P.R. 91; [1936]
3 D.L.R. 446; 66 C.C.C. 230 (sub nom. R. v. MacDonald) (N.S.S.C.) with
respect to the Nova Scotia Act which applies to committals within provincial
jurisdiction.
78. Re Trepanier (1895), 12 S.C.R. IlI; Re R. v. Wong Foon Sing (1925), 36
B.C.R. 120;44C.C.C. 133 (B.C.S.C.).
79. R. v. Thompson (1950), 1 W.W.R. 66; 99 C.C.C. 89 (B.C.S.C.); R. v.
Sednyk (1956), 14 Man. R. 7; 18 W.W.R. 180; 115 C.C.C. 128 (Man. Q.B.);R.
v. Krueger; [1949] 2 D.L.R. 569; [1949] 1 W.W.R. 140; 93 C.C.C. 245 (Man.
K.B.);R. v. Schellenberg (1958), 66 Man. R. 305; 26 W.W.R. 374; 122 C.CC.
132 (Man. Q.B.). It has been held that the provincial courts still have jurisdiction to
issue certiorari-in-aid to question committals of federal tribunals notwithstanding
s. 18 of the Federal Court Act: Exp. Kolot (1974), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 417 (B.C.S.C.);
Re Commonwealth of Virginia and Cohen (No. 2) (1973), 1 O.R. (2d) 262; 14
C.C.C. (3d) 174 (Ont. H.C.). Certiorari itself is precluded in certain cases: Re
Milbury & the Queen (1972), 4 N.B.R. (2d) 450;. 25 D.L.R. (3d) 499 (N.B.C.A.);
and see Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Hernandez (1973), 41 D.L.R. (3d) 549;
14 C.C.C. (2d) 209 (S.C.C.)
80. Supra, note 72.
81. Most of the cases put review on the footing of want of jurisdiction, but inR. v.
Thompson (1950), 1 W.W.R. 66; 99 C.C.C. 89 (B.C.S.C.), the court treated it as
- review of patent error.
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The technicality of the reasoning employed in the cases is to be
deprecated. The result is that while certiorari alone can be used to
review committals,8 2 it does not lie to review the evidence as this is
not seen as an exercise of jurisdictional review or review for error of
law on the face of the record when certiorari is sought alone.8a At
the same time, however, it is certiorari-in-aid that is said to provide
the basis for review of the evidence on habeas corpus. The
Canadian courts have held that an applicant for habeas corpus must
be in custody8 4 .As a consequence, someone free on bail must
surrender into custody on the day of his application if the grounds
for his application is want of evidence since it is only in this way
that he can apply for certiorari-in-aid of habeas corpus.85
Obviously there is a clear inconsistency in requiring
certiorari-in-aid to review the evidence, but refusing to review the
evidence when certiorari is sought by itself. The courts have tied
themselves unnecessarily in technical knots8 6 when the common
law practice provided ample justification for the review of evidence
on habeas corpus.
4. Superior and Inferior Courts
In order to understand properly the basis of the decisions, it is
82. R. v. Botting, [1966] 2 O.R. 121; 56 D.L.R. (2d) 25; [1963] 3 C.C.C. 373
(Ont. C.A.). cf. D. M. Gordon, "Quashing Committals for Trial" (1959), 2 Can.
B.J. 67.
83. R. v. Botting, [1966] 2 O.R. 121; 56 D.L.R. (2d) 25; [1963] 3 C.C.C. 373
(Ont. C.A.); Re Popoff (1959), 28 W.W.R. 317; 124 C.C.C. 115 (B.C.S.C.); R.
v. Matheson (1959), 123 C.C.C. 60 (N.S.S.C.).
84. The leading case isMasella v. Langlais, [1955] S.C.R. 263; [1955] Que. P.R.
375; [195514 D.L.R. 436; 112 C.C.C.I.
85. This practice is well established: Masella v. Langlais, id., at 271; Re
Shumiatcher, [1962] S.C.R. 38; 31 D.L.R. (2d) 2; 131 C.C.C. 259 (S.C.C.);
Hartt, supra, note 2 at 316-7. It has been suggested, however, that under the new
Criminal Code provisions, this may no longer be possible: Criminal Procedure,
Ontario Bar Admission Notes, 1973-4 at 494-5. The reason is that an order of
judicial interim release is effective until the completion of trial: s. 457.8. It is
submitted, however, that while the court no longer actually makes a bail order on
committing the accused for trial, by denying a discharge, the effect is the same.
The accused still may be surrendered into custody by his sureties (ss. 700, 701),
and presumbly could surrender himself where he is released on his undertaking or
own recognizance. The courts would, it is submitted, be reluctant to permit this
established procedure to be upset by such technical considerations: see Canadian
Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970,App. III, s. 2(c); Cox v. Hakes (1890) 15 App. Cas.
506. (H.L.)
86. In the Ontario Royal Commission-Inquiry into Civil Rights (Toronto: Queen's
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crucial to recognize the distinction between superior and inferior
courts. Habeas corpus has never been sought successfully where the
convictions or orders of courts of general common law jurisdiction
are concerned. While all the Canadian courts ultimately derive their
jurisdiction from statute, the courts which exercise this type of
jurisdiction are the courts of superior jurisdiction, courts of assize,
and with certain exceptions, courts of sessions.
87
The common law provided only the most awkward and
inadequate forms of redress with respect to errors made by these
courts. 88 While habeas corpus theoretically is never precluded as a
remedy and can always be used to require the jailer to justify an
imprisonment, as a practical matter, this has been of little avail
where committals by these courts are concerned. The reasons are
twofold. First, the principle of omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta
applies to orders issued by courts of general common law
jurisdiction. 89 This simply means that regularity must be presumed,
Printer, 1968), Report 1, Vol. 2, at 771, it is aptly said: "The technicalities of these
procedures make legalistic nonsense."
87. See Gordon, supra, note 1; Rubinstein, supra, note I at 109-10. The Ontario
pre-Confederation Act uses the phrase "court of record" and this has been
interpreted to mean the courts indicated: see the Ontario cases, cited infra, note 94;
cf. R. v. Gibson (1898), 29 O.R. 660; 2 C.C.C. 302 (Ont. H.C.); Ex p. Hill,
[1970] 1 O.R. 699; 9 D.L.R. (3d); [1970] 2 C.C.C. 264 (Ont. H.C.); Ex p.
Wortsman, [1971] 1 O.R. 136; 1 C.C.C. (2d) 316 (Ont. H.C.), holding that the
phrase does not encompass inferior courts of record. The exception with respect to
a court of sessions is the summary jurisdiction exercised when hearing trials de
novo: Gordon, supra, note I at 301; R. v. Arscott (1885), 9 O.R. 541 (Ont.H.C.);
R. v. Johnston (1906), 41 N.S.R. 105; 11 C.C.C. 10 (sub nora. R. v. Johnston
(No. 2)) (N.S.S.C.); R. v. Pepper(1909), 19 Man. R. 209; 12 W.L.R. 58; 15
C.C.C. 314 (Man. K.B.); R. v. Stone (1941), 56 B.C.R. 321; [1932] 4 D.L.R.
427; 76 C.C.C. 288 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Petit (1932), 57 C.C.C. 216 (Man. K.B.);
contraR. v. Beamish (1901), 8 B.C.R. 171; 5 C.C.C. 388 (B.C.S.C.);R. v. Miller
(1913), 25 W.L.R. 396; 25 C.C.C. 151 (Alta. S.C.); R. v. Moore, [1924] 3
W.W.R. 923 (B.C.S.C.).
88. The only form of direct review available was the writ of error, the inadequacy
of which was generally acknowledged: James Stephen, A History of the Criminal
Law of England, (London: MacMillan, 1883), Vol. 1 at 308-10; W.S. Holdsworth,
A History of English Law (7th ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1956) Vol. 1 at 215. It
removed the record of proceedings to be reviewed, but the court was restricted to
dealing only with those errors which appeared on the face of the record, a document
which disclosed nothing of the evidence or jury direction. There were few instances
where exception could be taken to the record and the courts held that if error were
available, no other direct method of attack, such as certiorari, could be used: Rice
v. R. (1616), 79 E.R. 345; Cro. Jac. 404;R. v. Bethel (1702), 87 E.R. 781; 6 Mod.
17;R. v. Justices of West Riding of Yorkshire (1798), 101 E.R. 1080; 7 T.R. 467;
R v. Pennegoes (1822), 107 E.R. 53; 1 B. & C. 142; Gordon, supra, note 1.
89. Re Sproule (1886), 12 S.C.R. 140; Peacock v. Bell (1667), 85 E.R. 84 at 87-8
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no matter how bald the terms of the instrument. 90 Secondly, the
records of common law courts have a sanctity which prevents
review of the decision even where an actual absence of jurisdiction
is alleged. 9 ' It is not permissible to impeach the validity of the
record by showing want of jurisdiction through extrinsic evidence.
There is said to be an exception to the inviolability of superior court
orders. If the record or order itself shows want of jurisdiction on its
face, the prisoner may obtain habeas corpus.9 2 This possibility for
review has, however, remained theoretical and superior courts have
virtual immunity.
93
In the Canadian cases, the courts have frequently acted on these
principles and this has usually arisen where it is sought to challenge
a criminal conviction. Almost without exception, it has been held
that convictions made by superior courts of criminal jurisdiction and
courts of general or quarter sessions cannot be challenged on habeas
corpus.94 In so holding, the courts have simply been following the
1 Wms. Saund. 73 at 74 "The rule for jurisdiction is, that nothing shall be intended
to be out of the jurisdiction of a Superior Court, but that which specially appears to
be so; and, on the contrary, nothing shall be intended to be within the jurisdiction of
an Inferior Court but that which is so expressly alleged."
90. Re Andrews (1847), 136 E.R. 491; 4 C.B. 226; Exp. Partington (1844), 115
E.R. 244; 6 Q.B. 649; Re Dunn (1847), 136 E.R. 859, 5 C.B. 215; Dodd's Case
(1858), 44 E.R. 1087; 2 De G. & J. 510;Re Crawford (1849), 116 E.R. 1397; 13
Q.B. 613; Brenan & Galen's Case (1847), 116 E.R. 188; 10 Q.B. 492; Carus
Wilson's Case (1845), 115 E.R. 759; 7 Q.B. 984;Exp. Lees (1860), 120 E.R. 718;
E.B. & E. 828;Exp. Fernandez (1861), 142 E.R. 349; 10 C.B. (N.S.) 3.
91. Re Sproule (1886), 12 S.C.R. 140. A good example of this principle in
operation is Re Newton (1855), 139 E.R. 692; 16 C.B. 97. The place of the
commission of the offence as stated in the record was not within the jurisdiction of
the Central Criminal Court. On habeas corpus, the court held that affidavits
showing where the stated place was could not be admitted as the issue of the situs of
the offence must be taken to have been decided against the prisoner by the jury. See
also: R v. Carlile (1831), 172 E.R. 763; 4 Car & P. 415; Re Clarke (1842), 114
E.R. 243; 2 Q.B. 619.
92. ReSproule (1886), 12 S.C.R. 140 at 205;Burdett v. Abbott (1811), 104 E.R.
501; 14 East 1 at 150;R. v. Paty (1704), 92 E.R. 232; 2 Ld. Raym. 1105, per Holt
C.J. (dissenting); Middlesex Sheriffs Case (1840), 113 E.R. 419; 11 Ad. & E 273;
Exp. Fernandez (1861), 10 C.B. (N.S.) 3 at 60; Rubinstein, supra, note 1 at 110.
93. In Re Sparrow (1908), 28 N.Z.L.R. 143, Chapman J. refused relief on the
merits, but suggested that habeas corpus could be used against a superior court in a
case of exceeded jurisdiction. See alsoR. v. Collyer & Capon (1752), 96 E.R. 797;
Sayer 44, where habeas corpus was awarded against an unlawful sentence at
quarter sessions.
94. For good examples of this, see Re Sproule (1886), 12 S.C.R. 140; Re
Ferguson (1892), 24 N.S.R. 106 (N.S.C.A.);In re Darby, [1964] S.C.R. 64. With
respect to county court or court of sessions convictions, the prevailing view is that
review is not possible:R. v. Crabbe (1854), 11 U.C.Q.B. 447 (C.A.);R. v. Powell
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common law principles. Unfortunately the language used does not
always unequivocally state that this is the basis for the decision, and
some dicta have been taken to limit the scope of review on habeas
corpus generally. 95 This is especially true of several decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada under its former original jurisdiction in
habeas corpus matters. 96 The Court was always anxious to limit the
use of habeas corpus to circumvent the ordinary system of appeals,
and it tended to discourage these applications, especially where a
criminal conviction was being challenged. 97 It is often supposed
that these cases establish the rule that on habeas corpus alone, 98
relief can only be granted if there is a defect of jurisdiction patent on
(1861), 21 U.C.Q.B. 215 (C.A.); R. v. St. Dennis (1875), 8 P.R. 16; R. v.
Goodman and Wilson (1883), 2 O.R. 468 (Ont. C.P.D.); R. v. Martin (1927), 60
O.L.R. 577; [192713 D.L.R. 1134; 48 C.C.C. 23 (Ont. C.A.); Goldhar v. The
Queen, [1960] S.C.R. 431; 25 D.L.R. (2d) 401; 126 C.C.C. 337. cf.,R. v. Wong
Cheun Ben (1930), 43 B.C.R. 188; [1930] 3 W.W.R. 282; 54 C.C.C. 399
(B.C.C.A.) allowing review on the grounds that jurisdiction depends upon a valid
election; and seeRe Helik (1939), 47 Man. R. 179; [1939] 3 D.L.R. 56; 72 C.CC.
76 (Man. K.B.).
95. See, e.g. Ex p. Macdonald (1896), 27 S.C.R. 683; 3 C.C.C. 15; Re
Henderson,[1930] S.C.R. 45; [1930] 1 D.L.R. 420; 52 C.C.C. 95; cases cited
supra, note 99.
96. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 259, s. 57 (repealed R.S.C. 1970, c. 44
(1st. Supp.), s. 4).
97. The Act allowed inquiry into tle cause of commitment "in any criminal case
under any Act of the Parliament of Canada". In Re Dean (1913), 48 S.C.R. 235; 9
D.L.R. 364; 20 C.C.C. 374, Duff J. held that the Act gave jurisdiction only where
the committal followed a charge which was an offence by virtue of an Act of
Parliament. Since the offence in question, theft, was clearly an offence at common
law, and since the description of the offence in the committal could have been
justified under a British statute still in force by virtue of the then s. 11, the requisite
elements were not present to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction. This reasoning
was followed in Smith v. The King, [1931] S.C.R. 578; [1931] 4 D.L.R. 465; 56
C.C.C. 51, where the warrant specified that the accused had been found guilty of
an offence 'contrary to the Criminal Code'. Since the Code did not create the
offence, again theft, and since it was still possible to prosecute common law
offences, it was said that the form of the charge did not bring it within the Court's
jurisdiction. This authority was put to rest when the revised Code specified in s. 8
that no one could be prosecuted for common law offences: Re Goldhar, [1958]
S.C.R. 692; 16 D.L.R. (3d) 509; 122 C.C.C. 113.
98. The Court refused to grant certiorari-in-aid of habeas corpus, notwithstanding
s. 61 of the Supreme Court Act which provided that certiorari may issue when
"...considered necessary with a view to any inquiry, appeal or other proceeding
had or to be had before the Court.": Re Trepanier (1885), 12 S.C.R. 111; Re
Shumiatcher, [1962] S.C.R. 38; 31 D.L.R. (2d)2; 131 C.C.C. 259. The rationale
was that habeas corpus came on in the first instance in chambers rather than in
court.
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the face of the documents returned. 99 It is submitted, however, that
this rule and the refusal to accept extrinsic evidence to show
jurisdictional error100 is only applied properly to cases in which a
superior court order is impugned. While the English courts have
discouraged in similar terms the use of habeas corpus to review
summary convictions, 10 1 they have not permitted the restriction to
qualifiy their powers of review in cases not involving convictions.
There is no reason that a similar approach should not be taken in
Canada. Indeed, if this restriction were a rule of general application,
habeas corpus would be an ineffective remedy. The rule is one
which is applicable to courts of general common law jurisdiction,
and provides an element of finality in the judicial process at that
level. 1 0 2 There is no reason to extend it beyond this class of case; to
make it a rule of general application is to misread the cases.
5. American Usage
The refusal to permit the use of habeas corpus to review convictions
contrasts markedly with the use of habeas corpus in the United
States. There, the principal use of the writ is as a post-conviction
remedy. Habeas corpus provides a vehicle for prisoners convicted
in the state courts to have the proceedings reviewed in the federal
courts where a right guaranteed by the constitution has been
violated.' 03 It is apparently thought that a constitutional claim can
best be weighed in a forum which is divorced from the guilt-finding
process, and which is able to establish uniform minimum national
standards for the administration of criminal justice. 10 4 There is,
99. See especially Re Sproule (1886), 12 S.C.R. 140; Goldhar v. The Queen,
[1960] S.C.R. 431; 25 D.L.R. (2d) 40; 126 C.C.C. 337; Re Shumiatcher, [1962]
S.C.R. 38; 31 D.L.R. (2d) 2; 131 C.C.C. 259.
100. Discussed in greater detail infra, at
101. In re Corke (Practice Note) [1954] 1 W.L.R. 899 [1954] 2 All E.R. 440
(D.C.).
102. See, eg. what was said by Denman C. J. in Carus Wilson's Case (1845), 115
E.R. 759, at 769; 7 Q.B. 984 at 1009; "The security which the public has against
the impunity of offenders is, that the Court which tries must be considered
competent to convict. We could not interfere in this way without incurring the
danger of setting at large persons committed for the worst offences." And see In re
RichardDunn (1847), 136 E.R. 859 at 860; 5 C.B. 215 at 218per Wilde C. J.: "[If
review were allowed] it would follow, that every sentence pronounced by the court
of Queen's Bench, would be subject to be reviewed summarily, even by a judge at
chambers."
103. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
104. For an excellent discussion, see "Developments in the Law - Federal
Habeas Corpus" (1969-70), 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1038.
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however, by no means unanimity on the propriety of federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction, 10 5 and this is understandable in view of the
protracted litigation which may follow any criminal proceeding
which gives rise to a constitutional claim.
In any case, the American experience with habeas corpus differs
significantly from that in England and in Canada. The writ
transplanted has virtually grown into a different strain altogether.
The Americans have taken the writ's fundamental purpose of
ensuring that every imprisonment is legally justifiable, and
developed it fully according to their profound belief in the
importance of broadly defined constitutional guarantees.
6. Material Before The Court
It has already been noted that the scope of review on habeas corpus
depends upon the material which may be looked at by the court. It
has also been noted that this is a question which has troubled the
Canadian judges considerably more than their English brethern. In
the Canadian cases, it is often said that on habeas corpus alone, the
court cannot look beyond the return of the jailer.-106 An escape from
this crippling rule is usually provided by certiorari-in-aid, the effect
of which is to broaden the inquiry- as if on certiorari itself. This
means that the entire record of the inferior proceedings is brought
before the court and that affidavit evidence showing jurisdictional
error may be introduced. While, in most cases, certiorari-in-aid
will provide an adequate solution, there are situations where it is not
available and where the issue will have to be determined on habeas
corpus alone. 10 7 For this reason, it is pwposed to examine the
authorities with a view to determining the techniques which may be
used to justify the reception of material other than the warrant or
committal documents when habeas corpus is sought alone.
105. See e.g., Henry Friendly, "Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on
Criminal Judgements" (1970), 38 U. Chi. L.R. 142.
106. See, e.g. R. v. Wood (1924), 27 O.W.N. 35; 43 C.C.C. 382 (Ont. S.C.); In
re Henderson, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 420; 52 C.C.C. 95 (sub noma. Exparte Henderson)
(S.C.C.); Petrovitch v. A.G. (1937), 40 Que. P.R. 411; Rolling v. Langlois,
[1958] B.R. 207 (C.A.); Re Perry and Steele (1959), 44 M.P.R. 267; 129 C.C.C.
206 (P.E.I.S.C.); Ex p. Peters, [1964] 2 O.R. 354; (1965] 2 C.C.C. 199 (Ont.
H.C.);Exp. Paterson (1971), 18 D.L.R. (3d) 84; 3 C.C.C. (2d) 181 (B.C.S.C.).
107. For a recent example, see Sanders v. The Queen [1970] S.C.R. 109; 10
D.L.R. (3d) 48; 71 W.W.R. 4; [1970] 2 C.C.C. 57, where it was held that
certiorari-in-aid was barred by s. 682 of the Criminal Code. No argument was
made that the court could determine the matter on extrinsic evidence, although the
majority went on the reject the application on the merits.
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There are two questions which arise. First, must the court always
accept the return of the jailer, or may it insist upon further
particulars beyond those disclosed initially by the documents in the
jailer's possession? Secondly, to what extent is extrinsic material
showing some defect in the proceedings admissible on habeas
corpus?
(a) Requiring a Full Return
On the first question, it is clear from an historical perspective that
if the courts had always been forced to restrict the inquiry to the
documents initially returned, habeas corpus would never have
become an effective remedy.10 8 The early cases stress the
overriding requirement that the return state fully the cause of the
imprisonment in terms which enable the court to determine for itself
the sufficiency of the cause. The leading common law authority
already discussed is Bushell's Case in 1670109 where Vaughan C. J.
made it clear that on habeas corpus the court's "judgement ought to
be grounded upon our own interferences and understandings, and
not upon their's [that of the inferior court]" .11o Many of the old
cases rest upon the proposition that the court could insist upon a full
return so that it could judge whether the applicant had been
regularly dealt with.'11 It has been seen that in the magisterial cases
the rule that the process show all the requisites of jurisdiction on its
face allowed for a pervasive scope of review. 112
While modern examples of this sort of reasoning are not often
found, 113 it is a technique which the Canadian courts do use on
occasion. One such case was Braaten v. Sargent and A. -G. for
B.C., where it was held that a committal for contempt by a Royal
Commission was bad for not setting out the offence on its face. 114
The court commented: "It may be said that some of the authorities
cited are very old and that the rights and remedies dealt with on
108. See e.g. Chamber's Case (1628), 179 E.R. 717; Cro. Car. 133; Hodd v.
High Commission Court (1615), 81 E.R. 125; 3 Bulst. 146; Codd v. Turback
(1615), 81 E.R. 94; 3 Bulst. 109.




113. Bushell's Case was applied in Ex p. McEwen and Sago, [1941] 4 D.L.R.
738; [1941] 3 W.W.R. 424; 76 C.C.C. 360 (sub nom. R. v. McEwen and Sago)
(Man. K.B.)
114. (1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 678; 59 W.W.R. 531 (B.C.S.C.).
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these applications are of ancient origin. It would seem to be that the
rights are still at least of equal importance today and that the
remedies are still valid." 115 Indeed, it can be argued that now that
habeas corpus cases are usually tried on the affidavits of the
prisoner and the jailer, 116 there is little reason to feel restricted to an
imagined return. When these cases actually were tried on the return
the courts devised ways to broaden the inquiry: nowadays there is
no reason for the court to feel limited to the committal documents if
those documents fail to set out the grounds for the imprisonment
with adequate clarity.
(b) Admission of Extrinsic Material
The second issue is that of the admissibility of extrinsic material
to establish grounds for review. This issue may be crucial where a
challenge to the validity of the detention is based upon jurisdictional
error. Here again, the English cases 1 17 indicate a less restrictive
approach than is suggested by some of the Canadian authorities and
it is submitted, neither the decided cases nor general principle
require that the restrictive approach be followed.
It has already been observed that part of the confusion here stems
from the failure to restrict properly the cases dealing with superior
court orders and convictions. As a general rule, the common law
always allowed inferior processes to be subject to collateral attack,
looking where necessary at evidence extrinsic to the inferior record
to show jurisdictional defect. 118 There is no reason that this should
not be possible where a challenge is made by way of habeas corpus.
Indeed, the English cases recognize properly that the rule for the
admissibilty of affidavits on habeas corpus is exactly the same as
that on certiorari. 119
115. Id., per Seaton J. at 689-90; 543.
116. Supra, note 2.
117. See, e.g. Re Eggington (1853), 118 E.R. 936; 2 El. & BI. 607; Swan v.
Dakins (1855), 16 C.B. 77; 139 E.R. 684;ReBailey (1854), 3 El. & Bl. 607; 118
E.R. 1269.ReAuthers (1889), 22 Q.B.D. 345;R. v. Board of Control, exp. Rutty,
[1956] 2 Q.B. 109; and see Paley on Summary Convictions, supra, note 13 at 790:
"The rule now appears to be the same as that which is applied to proceedings by
certiorari, where want or excess of jurisdiction may be shown by affidavit as
ground for quashing a conviction or order."
118. This was the case even on the 'strict' rule of jurisdiction expounded in R. v.
Bolton (1841), 113 E.R. 1054; 1 Q.B. 66.
119. Schtraks v. Government of Israel, [1964] A.C. 556 (H.L.(E)) at 605-6, per
Lord Hodson.
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Another problem in this area is caused by the old common law
rule against controverting the facts in the return. 120 The rule was
that the facts returned by the jailer had to be taken as true and that
those facts could only be impeached by the decision of a jury in an
action for false return. 121 The rule, however, probably never meant
more than that ultimate issues of fact (for example, the issue of guilt
or innocence in a criminal matter) could not be determined on
habeas corpus. Collateral issues which undermine the validity of
the detention by showing want of jurisdiction or want of authority
have always been determinable on habeas corpus.12 2 In the old
cases, it was said that the applicant could "confess and avoid" the
return. 123 In modern parlance, this simply means that the issue of
jurisdiction is open and that issues of fact relating to jurisdiction can
be entertained. 124 Evidence showing want of jurisdiction does not
controvert the return, but goes behind it to show that the jailer's
justification for the imprisonment cannot stand.
The common law rule has been abrogated expressly in Ontario in
both criminal 125  and provincial matters, 126  and in New
Brunswick, 127 Nova Scotia s28 and Prince Edward Island l2 9 in
provincial matters. 130 These legislative measures, derived from the
120. See especially Wilmot's Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus (1758),
Wilm. 81; 97 E.R. 31.
121. Id.
122. The authorities permitting evidence to be adduced on jurisdictional issues are
listed supra, notes 21, 32, 117, 119, and infra, note 133. Affidavits were received
in proceedings on habeas corpus before trial: R. v. Greenwood (1739), 93 E.R.
1086; 2 Str. 1138;Farington's Case (1682), 84 E.R. 1227; T. Jones 222; Kirk's
Case (1700), 187 E.R. 760; 5 Mod. 454;Jackson (1717), 2 Hawkins P.C. 169. In
the impressment cases, issues of fact were determined: Goldswain's Case (1778),
96 E.R. 711; 2 Black, W. 1207; R. v. King (1674), 90 E.R. 456, Comb. 245;
Good's Case (1760), 96 E.R. 137; 1 Black W. 251; Ex. p. Drydon (1793), 101
E.R. 235; 5 T.R. 417;R. v. Young (1808), 103 E.R. 650; 9 East 466. This was
recognized by Wilmot in his Opinion, supra, note 120 at 111-112.
123. Swallow v. London Corporation (1666), 82 E.R. 1110; 1 Sid. 287;
Gardener's Case (1600), 78 E.R. 1048; Cro. Eliz. 821.
124. Supra, note 122.
125. An Act for More Effectually Securing the Liberty of the Subject, 1866 (29 &
30 Vict., c. 45), s. 3.
126. The Habeas Corpus Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 197, s. 7.
127. The HabeasCorpus Act, R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 101, s. 6.
128. Liberty of the SubjectAct, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 164, s. 7.
129. Habeas Corpus and Certiorari Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1951, c. 70, ss. 3, 15.
130. For the test concerning the applicability of provincial legislation, see Re
Storgoff, [1945] S.C.R. 526; [1945] 3 D.L.R. 673 (sub nom R. v. Storgoff); 84
C.C.C. 1.
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English Habeas Corpus Act, 1816,131 do not appear to have been
interpreted to broaden the inquiry beyond the issue of
jurisdiction. 132
It must be recognized that there are cases which hold ostensibly
that the court is confined to the document returned.1 33 In some of
those, the extrinsic evidence was properly rejected as being
irrelevant to the issue of jurisdiction. In others, the special
considerations pertaining to the records of superior courts precluded
the consideration of extrinsic material. Affidavits have been
received in a number of Canadian habeas corpus cases,'13 4 and there
is authority for the view that issues of jurisdictional fact may be
entertained on habeas corpus.135 The practice of receiving
affidavits to show want of jurisdiction is well borne out by the
common law authorities cited, and it almost certainly is a proper
practice in Canada even where there is no legislation abrogating the
rule against controverting the return. 1
3 6
7. Conclusion
The Canadian courts have tended to be too technical in their
treatment of the scope of review on habeas corpus. In this article,
an attempt has been made to analyze these technical problems in the
light of established common law principles. It is from the English
common law that habeas corpus is derived, and an understanding of
this background is crucial. There can be little doubt that the cases
are in conflict on several points. It is submitted, however, that, read
131. 56Geo. III, c. 100.
132. For cases where the statutes were applied, see Ex p. Fitzpatrick (1893), 32
N.B.R. 182 (N.B.S.C.);Re Davidson (1915), 8 O.W.N. 481 (Ont. H.C.)
133. Supra, note 106.
134. See, e.g. R. v. Munro (t864), 24 U.C.Q.B. 44 at 53 (Ont. Q.B.); Re
McKinnon (1865), 2 C.L.J. 324 (Ont.);R. v. Boyle (1868), 4 P.R. 256 (Ont.);Ex
p. Eno (1884) 10 Que. L.R. 165 (Que. Q.B.);R. v. Cavelier (1896), 11 Man. R.
333; 1 C.C.C. 134 (Man. Q.B.);R, v. Whitesides (1904), 8 0.L.R. 622; 8 C.C.C.
478 (Ont. C.A.); Re Beck (1917), 27 Man. R. 288; 32 D.L.R. 15; [1917] 1
W.W.R. 657; 27 C.C.C. 331 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Montemurro, [1924] 2 W.W.R.
250 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Cardarelli, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 575; [1929] 2 W.W.R. 223;
(1929), 52 C.C.C. 267 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Rowan (1930), 42 B.C.R. 559; [193012
W.W.R. 227; 54 C.C.C. 197 (sub nom Exparte Rowan) (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Hardy
(1932), 46 B.C.R. 152; 59 C.C.C. 394 (B.C.S.C.);Shin Shim v. The King, [1938]
S.C.R. 378; [193814 D.L.R. 88; 70 C.C.C. 32L.
135. Id. See alsosupra, note 122.
136. The English Act of 1816, which applies to non-criminal cases, is in force in
those provinces with reception of English law after 1816.
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in the light of the common law authorities, a sound argument can be
made to support the following propositions:
1. Habeas Corpus opens two grounds of attack. First, the
applicant is entitled to be released if he can show jurisdictional error
which vitiates the justification offered for his imprisonment.
Secondly, the prisoner may succeed in certain cases if he can show a
patent defect on the face of the documents returned.
2. Where habeas corpus is used to challenge a committal for
trial or committal for extradition, and perhaps in related situations
as well, it is open to the court to review the evidence adduced before
the committing magistrate and to determine whether or not it is
reasonably capable of supporting the decision. While this form of
review has normally been based in Canada upon either special
statutory measures and certiorari-in-aid, it may be seen as a
common law practice which evolved in the days when habeas
corpus was used as a method to obtain bail.
3. The courts have considerable discretion in deciding what
material they should examine. In the first place, the common law
always frowned upon bald returns, and it is open to the court to
insist that the return of the jailer give some detail as to the basis for
the imprisonment. The court must be able to judge for itself the
sufficiency of the cause. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly,
where a decision is impugned on jurisdictional grounds, it is
submitted that the court properly may receive affidavit evidence to
demonstrate jurisdictional error.
4. The rule that the court can grant relief only where there is an
error of jurisdiction patent on the face of the documents returned by
the jailer is confined properly to cases where the order or conviction
of a court of general common law jurisdiction is impugned. This
rule should not be extended to cases which do not come within this
category.
